The Italian presidency of the European Union: an opportunity to review EU relations with Russia and EaP countries by Siddi, Marco
www.ssoar.info
The Italian presidency of the European Union: an
opportunity to review EU relations with Russia and
EaP countries
Siddi, Marco
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Siddi, M. (2014). The Italian presidency of the European Union: an opportunity to review EU relations with Russia and
EaP countries. (IEP Policy Briefs on Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 1). Berlin: Institut für Europäische Politik e.V.
(IEP). https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-395365
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
THE ITALIAN PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
IEP Policy Briefs on Eastern Europe and Central Asia
No. 1 
published 20 March 2014
Dialog Europa Otto Wolff - Stiftung
The EU’s policy towards Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
– A key role for Germany
An opportunity to review EU relations with Russia 
and EaP countries
Marco Siddi
IE
P 
Po
lic
y 
Br
ie
fs
 o
n 
Ea
st
er
n 
Eu
ro
pe
 a
nd
 C
en
tr
al
 A
si
a
2
About the author
Marco Siddi is Research Associate at Institut für Europäische Politik and Marie Curie Researcher at 
the University of Edinburgh. His main focus is on EURussia relations and Russian foreign policy. 
Previously, he worked at the Trans European Policy Studies Association (Brussels) and at the Institute 
of World Economics (Budapest). He studied at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna (MA) and the 
University of Oxford (BA).
About IEP
Since 1959, the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) has been active in the field of European 
integration as a non-profit organisation. It is one of Germany’s leading research institutes on foreign 
and European policy. 
IEP works at the interface of academia, politics, administration, and civic education. In doing so, IEP’s 
task include scientific analyses of problems surrounding European politics and integration, as well as 
promotion of the practical application of its research findings. | www.iep-berlin.de
About the series
IEP Policy Papers on Eastern Europe and Central Asia are published in the framework of the research 
project “The EU’s policy towards Eastern Europe and Central Asia – A key role for Germany”. This 
project, which aims at analysing the EU’s relations with its East European and Central Asian partners 
and the role of Germany therein, is led by the deputy director of IEP, Dr. Katrin Böttger and financially 
supported by the Otto Wolff-Foundation.
The Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) is a strategic partner of the European Commission, which 
supports its activities. This paper, like all publications in this series, represents only the view of its 
author. Copyright of this paper series is held by the Institut für Europäische Politik.
Editorial team
Publisher: Prof. Dr. Mathias Jopp, Director, IEP
Executive Editor: Dr. Katrin Böttger, Deputy Director, IEP
Layout: Sebastian von Stosch, IEP
Dialog Europa Otto Wolff - StiftungPublished in March 2014
IEP Policy Briefs on Eastern Europe and C
entral Asia
3
From 1 July to 31 December 2014 Italy will hold 
the rotating presidency of the European Union. Due 
to recent events in Ukraine, relations with Russia 
and with Eastern Partnership countries will most 
likely be at the top of the EU foreign policy agenda 
during the Italian presidency semester. Although 
the Treaty of Lisbon has limited the prerogatives 
of the rotating presidency in foreign policy, Italy 
can coordinate with the EU High Representative 
and use its special relationship with Russia in 
order to negotiate the stabilisation of Ukraine 
and revise the broader EU approach towards the 
Eastern neighbourhood.
Recent developments
The political crisis in Ukraine started after 
former President Viktor Yanukovych (following 
consultations with Russian leaders) refused to 
sign an Association Agreement with the European 
Union on the eve of the Eastern Partnership 
summit in Vilnius in late November 2013. In 
the days following Yanukovych’s decision, large 
street protests began in the Ukrainian capital, 
Kiev. Emboldened by Russia’s support, including 
the pledge to buy 15 billion dollars of Ukrainian 
debt and reduce the price of Russian gas by one 
third, Yanukovych attempted to crush the protests. 
In mid-January, the Ukrainian Parliament (where 
Yanukovych’s Party of Regions held a majority 
in coalition with the Ukrainian Communist 
Party) passed restrictive anti-protest laws and the 
police used harsher methods, which caused the 
first casualties. However, repressive measures 
strengthened support for anti-government 
demonstrations, which forced the resignation of 
Prime Minister Mykola Azarov (also a member 
of the Party of Regions). On 20 February 2014, a 
new escalation of protests and the violent response 
of the Ukrainian special police (Berkut) resulted 
in at least 88 dead. The day after, the French, 
German and Polish foreign ministers brokered a 
deal between Yanukovych and representatives 
of the opposition. However, street protesters 
rejected the deal and took control of presidential 
administration buildings, while Yanukovych fled 
to Russia. The opposition took over governmental 
and presidential posts ad interim and called for 
new presidential elections to be held on 25 May 
2014.
At the end of February, pro-Russian protests 
erupted in the East and South of Ukraine, in long-
standing strongholds of the Party of Regions. 
In Crimea, an autonomous republic with a 
majority of ethnic Russians, protests escalated 
into armed revolt, with the support of Russian 
troops deployed there and other units most likely 
sent from mainland Russia. As of early March, 
the Russian Federation refused to recognise 
the new government in Kiev, hosted ousted 
President Yanukovych and supported insurgents 
in Crimea, claiming that the security of ethnic 
Russians living there was threatened by the new 
authorities in Kiev. Despite heavy pressure from 
the international community, Russian and pro-
Russian Crimean troops took control of the whole 
Crimean peninsula, de facto cutting it off from the 
rest of Ukraine. In order to do this, Moscow also 
used units of its Black Sea fleet, which is anchored 
at the Crimean port of Sebastopol in accordance 
with a treaty signed with Ukraine in 1997 and 
recently extended by Yanukovych until 2042.
The role of the European Union
Until the Eastern Partnership summit in 
Vilnius, EU leaders pressured Yanukovych to sign 
the Association Agreement with the European 
Union. Faced with Yanukovych’s refusal, they 
rejected his proposal to reopen negotiations for a 
free trade area in a format that included Russia. 
After the eruption of street protests in Kiev, 
High Representative Catherine Ashton and other 
European leaders flew to the Ukrainian capital 
several times. While some European politicians 
openly sided with the protesters (including then 
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German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle), the 
heads of French, German and Polish diplomacy 
eventually attempted to mediate the crisis. 
The agreement between Yanukovych and the 
opposition on 21 February 2014 was the outcome 
of their efforts, but it was quickly made irrelevant 
by developments on the ground. 
During the crisis in Ukraine, the EU was 
criticised by both Russia and Ukrainian 
demonstrators. Russia accused Brussels of 
intervening in the affairs of a sovereign country, 
while protesters blamed the EU for being too 
cautious and seeking a deal with Yanukovych as 
late as 21 February 2014, a few hours before he 
left the country. Leaked documents, particularly 
a phone call between assistant US secretary of 
state Victoria Nuland and the US ambassador 
to Ukraine, revealed that discontent about EU 
diplomacy during the crisis existed also in US 
foreign policy circles. 
The Italian presidency of the EU
While the situation on the ground will certainly 
develop quickly over the next three months, it is 
improbable that the political crisis will be fully 
solved by the time Italy takes over the rotating 
presidency of the EU. Crimean separatism is likely 
to remain a major issue, as the local, pro-Russian 
authorities have called for a referendum on the 
region’s status at the end of March. In Ukraine, 
presidential elections are due to be held on 25 
May, but it is still unclear whether Russia will 
recognise the results and pull back its troops until 
then. Furthermore, the stabilisation of Ukraine 
and the implementation of any EU financial aid 
package are likely to involve discussions that will 
continue during Italy’s presidency.
While holding the presidency, Italy should 
attempt to play a more active role in the Ukrainian 
crisis than it did so far. Germany, Poland and 
France have been the most active member states 
in mediating the crisis, but their efforts can hardly 
be described as successful as of early March 
2014. In fact, tensions in Ukraine have continued 
to escalate and the EU’s relations with Russia 
are tense as never before in the post-Soviet era. 
Within this context, Italy can acquire a more 
important role by relying on its institutional 
function as holder of the presidency and its special 
relationship with Russia. The Italian company 
ENI, partially state-owned, is Gazprom’s main 
European partner. Moreover, Italy is the second 
largest EU foreign direct investor in Russia after 
Germany. Major Italian companies such as the 
Finmeccanica conglomerate, FIAT and IVECO 
(together with approximately another 500 smaller 
Italian companies) operate on Russian territory 
or have contracts with Russian partners. This 
gives Italy some economic leverage in relations 
with Russia. Most importantly, in the last decade 
economic cooperation has been accompanied 
by good political relations with Moscow. In this 
period, all Italian Prime Ministers (from Romano 
Prodi to Enrico Letta) visited Russia several times 
and signed important economic agreements with 
the Russian leadership.
Recommendations for the Italian 
presidency
1. Working together with the EU’s High 
Representative and the foreign ministers of France, 
Poland and Germany, the Italian presidency should 
support dialogue between the Russian leadership 
and the new Ukrainian government, with the 
ultimate objective of deescalating the crisis and 
stabilising Ukraine.
2. In negotiations forums including Russia, the 
Italian presidency should insist on the respect of 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity and ask that all 
Russian troops on Ukrainian soil return to their 
bases, in accordance with bilateral agreements 
between Moscow and Kiev.
3. In order to facilitate reconciliation within 
Ukraine, the Italian presidency should advocate 
making any financial assistance to the country 
conditional to the reestablishment of democratic 
order and to the respect of the rights of ethnic and 
linguistic minorities. This includes reinstating 
other languages (in addition to Ukrainian) 
as “official” in regions where substantial 
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ethnic minorities live.
4. The Italian presidency should seek Russia’s 
cooperation in fully including Southern and 
Eastern Ukraine in the constitutional process.
5. Within the European Union, the Italian 
Presidency should support a more inclusive 
Eastern Partnership, asking that Russia be 
granted at least observer status. The EaP should be 
reformed so that the policy is no longer conducive 
to geopolitical competition with Russia.
6. In relations with Russia, the Italian presidency 
should continue the human rights dialogue and 
attempt to build on the concessions made by Putin 
on the eve of the Olympic Games in Sochi (i.e. 
the release of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and of Pussy 
Riot members).
7. The Italian presidency should also support 
mediation efforts and monitoring missions launched 
by the United Nations and the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe.
